Dances with wolves

written by Suat KINIKLIOGLU

Tuesday, 6 September 2005

There is a considerable amount of irony in writing a column on Turkey's Kurds on the eve of Turkey's accession negotiations. After all, the European Council openly announced last December that Turkey had met the Copenhagen political criteria and would start accession negotiations with Turkey on Oct. 3, 2005. Similar to all of our citizens, Turkey's Kurds also have been able to reap the benefits of considerable reform packages passed in recent years.

As we approach another stormy deadline on our Turkey-EU calendar, one wonders why the Kurdish issue has become such an urgent issue again. Why on earth would Turkey's Kurds see fit to provoke Turkey on the PKK and Öcalan issues when it is obvious that such provocative actions would not serve the interest of Kurds in Turkey? Could it be that we have a problem of representation? Could it be that Turkey's Kurds have a clear dilemma as to who and how they should be represented on the political scene?

I touched on the danger of such political actions by the PKK last week, and I am reiterating my view on this: Turkey's Kurds would be ill advised to push on the Öcalan issue. Turkey's Kurds would not only damage their own viability and legitimacy in that matter but would also deal a severe blow to our delicate internal balances. Neither the future of the Kurds nor the future of this country can be built upon the death and destruction unleashed by the PKK. There is no basis to the “freedom fighters” argument of the 1970s, particularly in a post-Sept. 11 world. Responsible Kurds need to assume responsibility and steer the discourse away from the PKK and its sympathizers.  

We do know that the PKK and its sympathizers aim for a full-blown revamping of the Turkish political structure and dream about Turks and Kurds becoming constituent founders of a future republic. Even our European colleagues express their astonishment about the scope of such Kurdish demands. A European diplomat last week confided that they “have been telling DEHAP [Democratic People's Party] that Europe will never support such ambitions” and that they would be ill advised to think in that direction. It appears DEHAP executives had differing views. Indeed, generally European demands about Turkey's Kurds were articulated within the framework of individual rights -- not around becoming “constituent founders” of the Turkish Republic! As it is probably no surprise that Turks are bewildered by such ideas, what then are the recent wave of violence and the PKK's aggressive efforts due to? How can we explain that the PKK and its sympathizers are insistent on provoking the country despite the violent reactions by some impatient Turks? The incidents in recent months and on Sunday in Gemlik and Bozüyük clearly confirm my earlier warnings that this time we are dealing with a very different Turkish public opinion. Turks no longer have the patience of the 1990s and simply cannot relate to the PKK and its current dangerous agenda. Ordinary urban Turks perceive recent PKK attempts as terror incidents aimed at disrupting the precarious stability of this country. 

Should provocative actions by the PKK and its sympathizers continue, we are likely to see more of this backlash. I fear the more incidents we see, the more extreme the reaction of Turks will be. The last thing this country needs is communal violence. Turkey's Kurds must recognize the latent danger of the PKK's provocative actions. 

Coming back to the issue of representation, Turkey's Kurds are approaching a significant milestone. They either will disassociate themselves from the PKK and its sympathizers and thus will be able to distance themselves from violence, or they will be marginalized and radicalized. The latter option will be detrimental for the legitimacy and viability of Kurdish political concerns. Turkey's Kurds cannot base their political discourse solely on an “ethnic discourse.” If representatives of Turkey's Kurds cannot come up with a political discourse that has relevance to Turks as well, it is doomed to become a regional and limited affair with no significant impact on Turkish politics. Turkey's Kurds must leave “ethnic politics” behind and develop a national discourse. After all, they live in a national state.  

In the 1990s the PKK and the terrorism it unleashed damaged Turkey's regional perspectives in the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia. Those were the days -- although with a lack of realism -- when we were entertaining a geography stretching from “the Adriatic to the Chinese border.” PKK terrorism forced Turkey to turn inwards. This time around, the PKK carries the potential to damage Turkey's internal harmony, which has been sustained by a social fabric that resisted centuries-long ups and downs in this region. Let us hope that Turkey's Kurds will be able to apply sophistication and political wisdom and think hard on the issue of representation and marginalize the PKK. The alternative is too bleak and depressing. I am not willing to entertain it.