The blue waters of the Aegean were offering smooth recuperation from the turbulent months in our domestic political scene. Just when we thought there would be some measure of calm and quiet, Turkey’s neighborhood again made sure that it was all too ephemeral.

Apart from the physical rupture, the Russia-Georgia crisis has also brought the Caucasus, as a significant region, back into Turks and many Westerners’ mental maps. As someone who spent a good deal of time in the Caucasus, traveled extensively in the region and had the good fortune to enjoy Georgian, Azerbaijani and Armenian hospitality, I must say this is quite welcome from my perspective. That said, the crisis has also invited some serious soul-searching in the region, as well as in the transatlantic community.

Turkey responded quickly to the crisis and one of the most important byproducts of the post-conflict situation was the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which started in the form of football diplomacy and appears to promise a new opening in the bilateral relationship. Turkey intends to treat the intractable Caucasus riddle -- at least the Armenia-Azerbaijan component of it -- head on. As President Abdullah Gül rightly underlined, 17 years of Minsk Process diplomacy led nowhere and we Turks have a vital interest in not letting another frozen conflict remain so.

Ankara wants Baku and Yerevan to discuss issues under its umbrella and first establish diplomatic relations and then open the border with Azerbaijan. Although accelerated by the Russian-Georgian crisis, working towards normalization with Armenia was already a stated foreign policy objective by the government. Seen from the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) emphasis on the neighborhood for the last six years, there is nothing unusual about the recent process. Doubters of the wisdom of Ankara’s reintegration with its immediate neighborhood only need to see the exponential increase in our trade figures with these countries as well as the deepening political dialogue and increasing Turkish influence there. I will leave the intellectual tenets of our foreign policy on this issue for another column, but suffice it to say it has worked very well and we have already been garnering the benefits despite the short timeframe involved.

The Russia-Georgia crisis has been a winner for Turkey. Needless to say, we are very much concerned about the territorial integrity of our good neighbor Georgia. However, one cannot escape the nature of the European discourse on the crisis, which, once again, is confronted by the unavoidable (for some, painful) strategic fact that Turkey is key to the region and that Europe needs Turkey by its side if the region is to stabilize and provide critical energy security to a very energy-dependent continent.

I was in Poland last week and the Poles surely understand why Turkey must successfully complete the accession negotiations and be anchored irrevocably in the European Union. Whether the post-conflict European debate will bring other Europeans to a similar position remains to be seen. Yet, it looks increasingly absurd that the leadership of a founding member of the EU is so categorically opposed to Turkish membership but simultaneously expects Turkish assistance in the Mediterranean Union, the Syria-Israel peace talks and to significantly contribute to European security. The current status quo wherein France is blocking key chapters to be opened with Turkey, as well as leading the anti-Turkish camp in Europe, is increasingly unsustainable from a Turkish viewpoint.