Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took over the government in 2002 its foreign policy has become the target of criticism. After all, what the leadership of the AKP had undertaken was no easy task. The foreign policy elite of the AKP transformed Turkey’s foreign policy outlook despite an extremely cautious and conservative foreign policy bureaucracy.

Following foreign minister Abdullah Gül’s visit in Washington and the questions he was exposed to only confirms what sort of structural changes have been accomplished in the last four years. In his speech at the German Marshall Fund, Gül underlined Turkish sensitivities vis-à-vis the Armenian resolution looming on the horizon. He also offered a broad expose about the issues he himself and his ministry was dealing with. They ranged from energy security to the European Union, from Kirkuk to the stability of the Middle East to the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. Multidimensional it is indeed.  

The visit also reminded all of us about the current difficulties on the American side to appreciate the new Turkey at hand. Our American counterparts have a difficulty in digesting the changes in Turkey’s new foreign policy. Turkey is becoming a regional powerhouse that has a strong interest in normalizing with its neighborhood. Contrary to conventional thinking this is not an AKP phenomenon only. It is a structural change that is likely to have a durable impact for decades to come. The current tensions between the U.S. and Turkey very much resemble the incompatibility of a great power - regional power rivalry. Gone is the so-called golden age of the Özal years. All of us need to adjust to this new situation and ‘let Turkey be Turkey’. The earlier Washington recognizes this situation, the easier it will be to deal with Ankara and identify common interests – and there are many.

Gül’s foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoðlu also spoke at the German Marshall Fund. He laid out eloquently the intellectual basis of Turkey’s new foreign policy thinking. Particularly illuminating was his emphasis on how – with the exception of Armenia – Turkey was normalizing with its neighbors. He demonstrated with concrete examples how deeply Turkey is involved in the Middle East. He also stressed that Turkey was not going to shape its foreign policy along sectarian lines, a clear sign that Turkey does not want to be part of a Shi’a – Sunni divide, something commonly entertained in the West.

The primary mistake in the Washington policy community is the fixation with the Hamas visit or Turkey’s developing relations with Iran and Syria. What is actually occurring is that Turkey is integrating back to a neighborhood it has traditionally been part of. There is no reason to be concerned about this. Indeed, one could see the republican era as an anomaly in Turkish history and interpret Turkey’s current re-integration with the Middle East as a reversal of this anomaly.

Turkey is actually an extremely benevolent and constructive agent in its immediate neighborhood, including the Middle East. The new Turkey and the U.S. actually have a lot more common interests than is often recognized. What is required though is a mental paradigm shift among decision-makers in Washington and many European capitals that would acknowledge the new Turkey. This would necessitate them to deal with Turkey as a genuine partner rather than an afterthought. Turkish foreign policy is in the midst of a structural change that has had a great impact on how we conceptualize our regional identity. There is no doubt that it is in the interest of our western partners to adjust to this new situation and let Turkey be Turkey.